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1Secure Massive MIMO Relaying Systems in a
Poisson Field of Eavesdroppers
Tiep M. Hoang, Student Member, IEEE, Trung Q. Duong, Senior Member, IEEE, Hoang Duong Tuan,
and H. Vincent Poor, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—A cooperative relay network in the presence of
eavesdroppers, whose locations are distributed according to a
homogeneous Poisson point process, is considered. The relay
is equipped with a very large antenna array and can exploit
maximal ratio combing (MRC) in the uplink and maximal ratio
transmission (MRT) in the downlink. We consider a realistic
model that the channel state information of every eavesdropper
is not know as eavesdroppers tend to hide themselves in practice.
The destination is thus in a much weaker position than all the
eavesdroppers because it only receives the retransmitted signal
from the relay. Under such setting, we investigate the security
performance in two schemes for relaying operation: amplify-and-
forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF). The secrecy outage
probability, the connection outage probability, and the trade-off
problem which is controlled by the source power allocation are
examined. Finally, suitable solutions for the source power (such
that once the transmission occurs with high reliability, the secure
risk is below a given threshold) are proposed for a trade-off
between security and reliability issue.
Index terms—Security, massive MIMO, Poisson point pro-
cess, maximum-ratio combining, maximum-ratio transmission,
amplify-and-forward, decode-and-forward.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security (PLS) has attracted considerable
attention from both academia and industry in recent years
[1]. With the recent emergence of large antenna arrays [2],
PLS is a promising approach for massive multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) systems as countermeasures against
eavesdropping attacks. Noticeably, the desired characteristics
of massive MIMO systems are not present in conventional
systems with small antenna arrays, e.g. an inner product
of two random vectors can converge in distribution. Indeed,
massive MIMO systems have been demonstrated to improve
secure performance in several studies [3]–[12]. Having said
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that, the role of massive MIMO systems in preventing eaves-
droppers is not completely understood yet, mainly because
PLS contains relatively many distinct aspects such as artifi-
cial noise (AN) technique, antenna/relay/jammer/user selection
techniques, and strategies to deal with the leakage of informa-
tion. Besides, different combinations of secure and relaying
techniques also make security scenarios more diverse. Thus,
the issue of security in massive MIMO relaying systems is
still largely open.
Additionally, it is should be mentioned that the assumption
of presence of eavesdroppers is always of crucial importance.
Several works assumed that the information of eavesdroppers
is available at transmitters; however, that assumption is im-
practical in general. Since the location of eavesdroppers is
typically not known, many authors have taken into account
the spatial distribution of eavesdroppers by adopting a spatial
point process model. For example, in order to model the
spatial location of eavesdroppers, the authors in [13]–[15] used
a homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP) model because
of its mathematical tractability. It should also be noted that
in the context of stochastic geometry, the PPP is the most
widely used and important point process to describe spatially
distributed discrete nodes [16]–[18]. Thus, the PPP will be
adopted to model the spatial location of eavesdroppers in this
paper.
Among recent works on the security for massive MIMO
relaying systems [3]–[8], the authors in [3] and [4] consid-
ered cooperative relay systems and compared the security
improvement for both amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-
and-forward (DF) relaying, while only the AF scheme (or
the DF scheme) was considered in [5] and [6] (or in [7]
and [8]). These works, however, did not consider any direct
link between source and eavesdropper. Note that in general,
eavesdroppers may possibly receive two versions of trans-
mitted messages from source and relay in cooperative relay
networks. The lack of direct links in [3]–[8] leads to the
fact that the way eavesdroppers benefit from the configuration
of cooperative relay networks is not sufficiently interpreted.
Meanwhile, the impact of a direct eavesdropping link on the
secure performance was presented in [19], but there was no
discussion on large antenna arrays. Finally, other recent papers
on secure massive MIMO networks (not necessarily relay-
aided networks) can be also found out in the literature (e.g.
[9]–[12]) with the discussion about the impact of the so-
called pilot contamination scheme in which an eavesdropper
can send a pilot sequence to attack massive MIMO systems,
2but this context is beyond the scope of our paper.1 Note that
none of the above papers (i.e. [3]–[12]) discussed the spatial
locations of eavesdroppers as a whole and the impact of direct
eavesdropping links in particular.
On the contrary, the works in [13]–[15] considered the same
assumption of the eavesdroppers’ spatial distribution as in
this work, but the topic of large antenna arrays was not dis-
cussed. For example, [13] analyzed the secure performance for
millimeter wave systems instead of massive MIMO systems.
While the authors in [14] and [15] used an artificial noise
instead of large antenna arrays, to deal with eavesdropping
attacks. Given that the artificial noise technique is also a
signal generation process, it may be not necessarily adopted
for large-scale antenna systems to reduce complexity, because
such systems themselves can provide considerable benefits in
terms of security [4]. Aiming to investigate the joint impact
of massive MIMO systems and the eavesdroppers’ geometric
locations on the secure performance, [20] analyzed the se-
crecy outage probability (SOP) with emphasis on the possible
areas of eavesdroppers. However, the geometric location of
eavesdroppers in [20] is assumed to be uniformly distributed
with a fixed number of eavesdroppers. Such an assumption is
likely to be unreasonable for the wireless systems which do
not have the knowledge of the number of stealthily working
eavesdroppers. It is clear that the assumption of PPP has not
yet adopted for secure massive MIMO systems as a whole,
and secure massive MIMO relaying systems in particular.
In short, the works on security (mentioned in the above
paragraphs) analyzed either massive MIMO system without
the use of PPP, or conventional MIMO systems with the
use of PPP. Thus, our work is to fill this gap by adopting
the practical assumption of PPP for the cooperative wireless
systems with large antenna arrays. In this paper, we consider a
secure wireless network with the aid of a large antenna array
at an intermediate relay. As for the relaying strategy at the
relay, we choose to discuss conventional relaying schemes like
the AF scheme and the DF scheme for comparison purposes,
instead of delving into recently-developed relaying schemes
(e.g. [21]). Around the relay, there exist many potential eaves-
droppers whose location information is assumed to follow the
PPP; thus, we take the direct links between source and eaves-
droppers into account. While the direct link between source
and destination is assumed to be impaired and neglected.
Intuitively, all potential eavesdroppers are taking advantage of
the physical setup model rather than the destination because
they receive two versions of confidential signals. To elucidate
how harmful the eavesdroppers can be, we evaluate the secure
performance by using the SOP. Then we use an ON-OFF
scheme for the transmission in which the source transmits its
messages only when the legitimate channels are strong enough
(i.e. reliable enough). To elucidate how reliable the secured
transmission can be, we evaluate the performance by using
the connection outage probability (COP). Finally, based on
the SOP and the COP, we examine the most secured state at
which our system is guaranteed at most, and show that this
1The context of pilot contamination can be ignored when considering a
single cell, and especially when the pilot training only accounts for a very
little portion of each coherence interval.
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Fig. 1. System model.
state can be achieved when the source power is just slightly
larger than a certain threshold (as long as the COP reaches 0).
We also note that the asymptotic expressions are derived for
the SOP and the COP in each distinct relaying strategy. We
observe that if the ratio of the average transmit power at the
source to the average noise power at the destination is high,
the security aspect of the proposed system seems to depend on
only the eavesdroppers’ working range as well as the intensity
of their presence. We also observe that when the source power
increases, the SOP reaches its largest limit, while the COP
equals 0. Besides, in both cases of relaying, the reliability of
the system is demonstrated to gain from the increased number
of antennas. Finally, our numerical results show the agreement
between analysis and simulation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II describes the network configuration and restricts the case
study to the worst case. In Section III, we provide the
approximate characterization of the received signal-to-noise
ratios (SNRs) under the influence of large antenna array.
Sections IV and V derive the exact and asymptotic expressions
for the SOP and the COP, respectively. In Section VI, two
optimization problems are suggested for the AF scheme and
the DF scheme to improve the secure performance. Numerical
results are shown in Section VII and finally, conclusions are
provided in Section VIII.
Notation: [·]T , [·]∗, and [·]† denote the transpose opera-
tor, conjugate operator, and Hermitian operator, respectively.
Vectors and matrices are represented with lowercase boldface
and uppercase boldface, respectively. In is the n× n identity
matrix. ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. E {·} denotes
expectation. z ∼ CNn (Σ) denotes a complex Gaussian vector
z ∈ Cn×1 with zero-mean and covariance matrix Σ ∈ Cn×n.
Exp (r) denotes the exponential distribution with rate r.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a cooperative relay network
in which there is a single source (S), a trusted relay (R), a
destination (D), and multiple passive eavesdroppers (Ei with
i = 1, 2, . . .).2 The distance between S and D is very far so that
2We consider a practical scenario in which each Ei tends to hide itself,
thus all eavesdroppers are referred to as passive.
3R is invoked to help convey messages from S to D. As such,
it is rational to consider that there is no direct link between
S and D. However, the direct link between S and Ei is taken
into account since Ei is likely to be present around S and/or R
to overhear some confidential messages. We assume that R is
equipped with a very large receive antenna array to decode
its received signal in the uplink and a very large transmit
antenna array to forward its decoded signal in the downlink;
meanwhile, each of the remaining nodes (i.e. S, D and Ei)
has only one antenna. It should be noted that both the number
of transmit antennas and the number of receive antennas at R
are equal to N  2. The eavesdroppers are assumed to be
spatially distributed according to a homogeneous PPP Ψ with
intensity λ > 0, and yet they are only present within a circle
B(RΨR0), which is centered at the origin R with the radius
RΨR0.3 By keeping silent to steer clear of being detected,
eavesdroppers do not get involved in actions like attacking
pilot sequences.
Regarding propagation model, we discuss both small-scale
and large-scale fading factors. The small-scale fading is char-
acterized by hXY ∈ Cn×1
(
or hTXY ∈ Cn×1
)
with its signal
magnitude being Rayleigh distributed. We assume that the
column vector hXY
(
or hTXY
)
obeys CNn (In). The large-scale
fading is characterized by l−α/2XY with α > 2 being the path-
loss exponent and lXYR0 being the distance of the X−Y link.
In path loss models [22]–[24], lXY is understood as the ratio
of the real distance to R0. For example, R0 is often taken to
be 100 m for microcells [24], then lXY = 2 means that the
real distance between X and Y is 2R0 = 200 m.
To facilitate the analysis, we use polar coordinates with R
being the origin (as aforementioned) and φ being the angle
ŜREi. Then we have lSE =
√
L2SR + l
2 − 2LSRl cosφ with
LSR ≡ lSR, LRD ≡ lRD and l ≡ lRE. Obviously, lSE is a function
of l and φ due to the random spatial distribution of Ei.
Regarding transmission, we use two equal time slots. In the
first time slot, S transmits the source signal s ∈ C to R. In the
second time slot, S keeps silent while R forwards the relaying
signal r ∈ CN×1 to D. In these two phases, both the signal
transmitted from S (i.e. s) and the signal retransmitted from
R (i.e. r) are overheard by Ei.
• We normalize s such that E
{|s|2} = 1, then the signals
received at R and Ei in the first time slot are, respectively,
written as
yR =
√
γSL
−α/2
SR hSRs+ nR, (1)
yE,1 =
√
γSl
−α/2
SE hSEs+ nE,1 (2)
where nR ∼ CNN (IN ) and nE,1 ∼ CN1 (1) are the
additive white Gaussian noises (AWGNs) at R and Ei,
respectively; L−α/2SR hSR ∈ CN×1 and l−α/2SE hSE ∈ C are
the complex channel coefficients for the S-R and S-Ei
links.
3It is of crucial important that if λ is measured by the average number of
eavesdroppers over the area of R20, then average number of eavesdroppers
within the circle B(RΨR0) is calculated as λ
∫RΨ
0
∫ 2pi
0 ldldφ but not
λ
∫RΨR0
0
∫ 2pi
0 ldldφ. Herein, R0 is referred to as a reference distance, while
RΨ is the ratio of the real radius to R0. For example, if we have R0 = 1
km and RΨ = 2, the radius of the considered circle will be 2 km.
• We normalize r such that E
{
rr†
}
= IN , then the
signals received at D and Ei in the second time slot are,
respectively, written as
yD =
√
γR/NL
−α/2
RD h
T
RDr + nD, (3)
yE,2 =
√
γR/Nl
−α/2hTREr + nE,2 (4)
where nD ∼ CN1 (1) and nE,2 ∼ CN1 (1) are AWGNs
at D and Ei, respectively; L−α/2RD hRD ∈ C1×N and
l−α/2hRE ∈ C1×N are the complex channel coefficients
the R-D and R-Ei links.
We note that for simplification purpose, the average noise
power at each receive antenna is assumed to be the same.
This leads to the fact that both (1) and (2) contain the same
γS, while both (3) and (4) contain the same γR. With the
noise normalization, γS is both the average received SNR per
antenna at R and the average received SNR at Ei, while γR
is the average received SNR at D as well as Ei. It should
also be noted that the subscript [·]E is implicitly related to Ei
with i ∈ Ψ; however, the index i is dropped for notational
simplicity.
A. MRC/MRT at Relay
After being received at R, the signal yR is then multiplied by
a weighting vector w† ∈ C1×N through a process called MRC
to combine N received signals in (1). Moreover, in the uplink,
w is designed only based on hSR because the instantaneous
hSE is not known (i.e. there is no the CSI of Ei). 4 Hence,
according to MRC principle, we have w = hSR/‖hSR‖. The
obtained signal after this process can be written as
r0 = w
†yR =
√
γSL
−α/2
SR ‖hSR‖s+
h†SR
‖hSR‖nR. (5)
The MRC output signal r0 is then processed by R according to
relaying operation (AF scheme or DF scheme). Consequently,
the obtained signal posterior to relaying operation is r̂0 which
is then multiplied by another weighting vector v ∈ CN×1
to form the retransmitted signal r. In the same way as the
design of w, the weighting vector v is designed only based
on hRD. As such, applying MRT to the downlink, we have
v = h∗RD/‖hRD‖. Hence, the relation between the decoded
signal r̂0 and the retransmitted signal r can be given by
r = vr̂0 =
h∗RD
‖hRD‖ r̂0. (6)
In the following, the expressions for r̂0 will be discussed based
on two different relaying operations, namely, AF scheme and
DF scheme.
1) AF Scheme at R: In this case, the signal r̂0 is simply a
scaled version of the signal r0, i.e.
r̂0 = c
AF r0 (7)
where cAF is a constant subject to the following transmit
power constraint
tr
(
E
{
rr†
})
= tr (IN ) = N. (8)
4Since the design of w does not take hSE into account due to the lack of
the CSI of Ei, the design of w according to MRC principle is not the optimal
solution in terms of security.
4Using (5)–(8) yields
cAF =
√
N
γSL
−α
SR ‖hSR‖2 + 1
. (9)
Substituting (5) and (9) into (6)–(7), we obtain a new expres-
sion of r and then again substituting this new expression into
(3)–(4), we can rewrite (3)–(4) as
yAFD =
√
γSγRL
−α
SR L
−α
RD ‖hSR‖2
γSL
−α
SR ‖hSR‖2 + 1
‖hRD‖s+ nAFD , (10)
yAFE,2 =
√
γSγRL
−α
SR l
−α‖hSR‖2
γSL
−α
SR ‖hSR‖2 + 1
hTREh
∗
RD
‖hRD‖ s+ n
AF
E,2 (11)
where
nAFD ,
√
γRL
−α
RD ‖hRD‖2
γSL
−α
SR ‖hSR‖2 + 1
h†SR
‖hSR‖nR + nD, (12)
nAFE,2 ,
√
γRl−α
γSL
−α
SR ‖hSR‖2 + 1
hTREh
∗
RDh
†
SR
‖hRD‖‖hSR‖nR + nE,2. (13)
2) DF Scheme at R: In this case, we consider the case that
both the source and the relay use the same codeword for their
transmission [25]. The signal r̂0 is successfully decoded from
the signal r0, thus we have the following relation
r̂0 = c
DF s, (14)
where cDF is a constant subject to the constraint (8). From
(6), (8) and (14), we have cDF =
√
N whereby (6) can be
given by
r =
h∗RD
‖hRD‖
√
Ns. (15)
Substituting the above expression into (3)–(4), we can rewrite
(3)–(4) as
yDFD =
√
γRL
−α/2
RD ‖hRD‖s+ nD, (16)
yDFE,2 =
√
γRl
−α/2 h
T
REh
∗
RD
‖hRD‖ s+ nE,2. (17)
B. Signal-to-Noise Ratios in the Worst Case
A wise Ei can be capable of exploiting the best possible
decoding strategy to maximize its received signals. Herein, we
suppose that Ei is able to use MRC process to combine one
signal from S and N signals from R. Obviously, the strategy
of malicious eavesdroppers in AF scheme is different from
that in DF scheme.
1) AF Scheme at R: From (2) and (11), the overall received
signals at Ei can be written as
yAFE =
 √γSl−α/2SE hSE√
γSγRL
−α
SR l
−α‖hSR‖2
γSL
−α
SR ‖hSR‖2+1
hTREh
∗
RD
‖hRD‖

︸ ︷︷ ︸
,gAF
s+
[
nE,1
nAFE,2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,n˜AF
. (18)
Then using MRC receiver with the weighting vector fAF , we
can write the combined output at Ei as
zAFE =
(
fAF
)†
gAF s+
(
fAF
)†
n˜AF . (19)
From (19), the instantaneous SNR at Ei can be generally
written as [26]5
ŜNRE(fAF ) =
(
fAF
)† (
gAF
(
gAF
)†)
fAF
(fAF )
†
R˜AF fAF
≤ (gAF )† (R˜AF)−1 gAF (20)
where R˜AF is the covariance matrix of n˜AF . The equality
in (20) holds for
fAF = τ
(
R˜AF
)−1
gAF , fAFopt (21)
with τ being an arbitrary constant. It is apparent that in
practice, a wise Ei is likely to design fAF = fAFopt to maximize
its received SNR. Taking this into account, we assume that the
received SNR at Ei is
ŜNRE ≡ ŜNRE(fAFopt ) =
(
gAF
)† (
R˜AF
)−1
gAF . (22)
As such, we will only discuss this practical scenario through-
out the rest of this paper.
The covariance matrix of n˜AF in (18) can be expressed as
R˜AF = E
{
n˜AF
(
n˜AF
)†}
=
[
1 0
0
γRl
−α|hTRDh∗RE|2
(γSL−αSR ‖hSR‖2+1)‖hRD‖2
+ 1
]
. (23)
Substituting gAF in (18) and R˜AF in (23) into (22), we can
write the instantaneous SNR at Ei in the case of AF as
ŜNR
AF
E =
γSL
−α
SR γRl
−α‖hSR‖2|hTRDh∗RE|2(
γSL
−α
SR ‖hSR‖2 + 1
) ‖hRD‖2 + γRl−α|hTRDh∗RE|2
+ γSl
−α
SE |hSE|2. (24)
From (10), the instantaneous SNR at D can be given by
ŜNR
AF
D =
γSL
−α
SR γRL
−α
RD ‖hSR‖2‖hRD‖2
γSL
−α
SR ‖hSR‖2 + γRL−αRD ‖hRD‖2 + 1
. (25)
2) DF Scheme at R: Unlike the AF scheme, the expressions
of SNRs for the DF scheme are formulated in a different way.
When only considering the indirect transmission from S to D
through R, we can infer the instantaneous SNR at Ei from (1)
and (17) as follows [29]:
ŜNR
DF
E, indirect = min
{
γSL
−α
SR ‖hSR‖2, γRl−α
|hTRDh∗RE|2
‖hRD‖2
}
.
(26)
5Since the term R˜AF in (20) is positive definite, we can factorize it into
U†U by using Cholesky decomposition. The left hand side of (20) can be
rewritten as ŜNRE(f0) =
[
f†0
(
g0g
†
0
)
f0
]/(
f†0 f0
)
where f0 , UfAF ∈
C2×1 and g0 ,
(
U†
)−1
gAF ∈ C2×1. Obviously, the new expression of
the instantaneous SNR at Ei with respect to f0 is now a Rayleigh quotient
[27]– [28], therefore we have maxf0 ŜNRE(f0) = λmax
(
g0g
†
0
)
= ‖g0‖2
where λmax is the maximum eigenvalue of g0g
†
0, and the last equality follows
from that g0g
†
0 is of one rank. Then the right hand side of (20) is obtained
by substituting g0 =
(
U†
)−1
gAF and U†U = R˜AF .
5Similarly, when only considering the direct S-Ei link, we can
infer the instantaneous SNR at Ei from (2), i.e.
ŜNR
DF
E, direct = γSl
−α
SE |hSE|2. (27)
Finally, with the assumption that Ei uses MRC technique to
combine signals from direct and indirect links, the instanta-
neous SNR at Ei can be given by [26]:
ŜNR
DF
E = ŜNR
DF
E, indirect + ŜNR
DF
E, direct
= min
{
γSL
−α
SR ‖hSR‖2, γRl−α
|hTRDh∗RE|2
‖hRD‖2
}
+ γSl
−α
SE |hSE|2.
(28)
From (1) and (16), the instantaneous SNR at D can be given
by [29]
ŜNR
DF
D = min
{
γSL
−α
SR ‖hSR‖2, γRL−αRD ‖hRD‖2
}
. (29)
Observation: From (24)–(25) we can see that both ŜNR
AF
E
and ŜNR
DF
D are increasing functions of γS. Thus, there will
be a need to find out a suitable value of γS in making the
trade-off between these SNRs. In contrast, the same does not
hold for ŜNR
DF
E and ŜNR
DF
D . In both relaying operations, γR
will not be examined for our trade-off problem. With the large
number of antennas configured at R, it is plausible to remain
the average total relay power (i.e. γR) constant such that the
consumed power per-antenna unit at R is reduced.
III. THE SNR APPROXIMATION UNDER THE IMPACT OF
LARGE ANTENNA ARRAYS
In this section, we will evaluate the secure performance of
the proposed system under the assumption that the number of
transmit and receive antennas at R is very large. Recall the
following well-known properties:6
• Property (P1): Let p ∈ CN×1 and q ∈ CN×1 be
complex-valued column vectors whose elements are i.i.d.
random variables with zero mean and variances of σ2p
and σ2q . Then (1/
√
N)pTq
dist→ CN (0, σ2pσ2q) where dist→
denotes convergence in distribution as N →∞.
• Property (P2): With p and q as in (P1), we have
1
N ‖p‖2
N→∞−−−−→ σ2p as well as 1N ‖q‖2
N→∞−−−−→ σ2q where
N→∞−−−−→ denotes convergence as N →∞.
To proceed, we first rewrite (24)–(25) as
ŜNR
AF
D = N
γSL
−α
SR γRL
−α
RD
‖hSR‖2
N
‖hRD‖2
N
γSL
−α
SR
‖hSR‖2
N + γRL
−α
RD
‖hRD‖2
N +
1
N
, (30)
ŜNR
AF
E = γSl
−α
SE |hSE|2
+N
γSL
−α
SR γRl
−α ‖hSR‖2
N
|hTRDh∗RE|2
N
N
(
γSL
−α
SR
‖hSR‖2
N +
1
N
)
‖hRD‖2
N + γRl
−α |hTRDh∗RE|2
N
(31)
6These properties are derived from the Lindeberg-Levy theorem and law
of large numbers (see [2], [30], [31] and references therein).
and (28)–(29) as
ŜNR
DF
D = N min
{
γSL
−α
SR
‖hSR‖2
N
, γRL
−α
RD
‖hRD‖2
N
}
, (32)
ŜNR
DF
E = γSl
−α
SE |hSE|2
+N min
{
γSL
−α
SR
‖hSR‖2
N
, γRl
−α |hTRDh∗RE|2
N
1
N
‖hRD‖2
N
}
.
(33)
Then, respectively applying Property (P1) to the term h
T
RDh
∗
RE√
N
and applying Property (P2) to the terms ‖hSR‖
2
N and
‖hRD‖2
N ,
we can arrive at the following approximate expressions:
ŜNR
AF
D
N→∞−−−−→ γSL
−α
SR γRL
−α
RD N
2
γSL
−α
SR N + γRL
−α
RD N + 1
, snrAFD , (34)
ŜNR
AF
E
N→∞−−−−→ γSL
−α
SR γRl
−αNΘ(
γSL
−α
SR N + 1
)
+ γRl−αΘ
+ γSl
−α
SE |hSE|2
, snrAFE , (35)
ŜNR
DF
D
N→∞−−−−→ min{γSL−αSR N, γRL−αRD N} , snrDFD , (36)
ŜNR
DF
E
N→∞−−−−→ min{γSL−αSR N, γRl−αΘ}+ γSl−αSE |hSE|2
, snrDFE (37)
where Θ , 1N
∣∣∣hRDh†RE∣∣∣2. Note that we have
1√
N
hRDh
†
RE
dist→ CN (0, 1) by using Property (P1) and
thus, Θ ∼ Exp (1).7 In (34)–(37), snrAFD , snrAFE , snrDFD and
snrDFE are defined as functions in N .
Let Emax denote the strongest eavesdropper that is receiv-
ing the largest instantaneous SNR among all eavesdroppers
Ei ∈ Ψ. Then the instantaneous SNRs at Emax in the AF
scheme (ŜNR
AF
Emax) and in the DF scheme (ŜNR
DF
Emax) are
approximated as
ŜNR
AF
Emax ≡ maxEi∈Ψ ŜNR
AF
E
N→∞−−−−→ max
Ei∈Ψ
snrAFE , (38)
ŜNR
DF
Emax ≡ maxEi∈Ψ ŜNR
DF
E
N→∞−−−−→ max
Ei∈Ψ
snrDFE . (39)
To facilitate the general analysis which can be ap-
plied to both schemes, we use the following notations:
ŜNRD =
{
ŜNR
AF
D , ŜNR
DF
D
}
, ŜNRE =
{
ŜNR
AF
E , ŜNR
DF
E
}
,
snrD =
{
snrAFD , snr
DF
D
}
, snrE =
{
snrAFE , snr
DF
E
}
, and
maxEi∈Ψ snrE =
{
maxEi∈Ψ snrAFE ,maxEi∈Ψ snr
DF
E
}
.
Proposition 1. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
snrAFE is given by
FsnrAFE (µ) = 1− Tµm(l)1(µm < γSL
−α
SR N)
− γSL
−α
SR N(1 + γSL
−α
SR N)
γRl−α
Jµm(l, lSE) (40)
where
µm , min{µ, γSL−αSR N},
7Exp (r) denotes the exponential distribution with rate r. If z ∼
CN
(
0, σ2
)
, then |z|2 ∼ Exp (1/σ2).
61(C) =
{
1, if C is true
0, otherwise , (41)
Tµm(l) , exp
{
(1 + γSL
−α
SR N)µm
γRl−α(µm − γSL−αSR N)
}
(42)
and
Jµm(l, lSE) , e
− µ
γSl
−α
SE
∫ µm
0
e
x
γSl
−α
SE
+
(1+γSL−αSR N)x
γRl
−α(x−γSL−αSR N)
(x− γSL−αSR N)2
dx.
(43)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2. The CDF of snrDFE is given by
FsnrDFE (µ) = 1− e
− µm
γRl
−α
+
γSl
−α
SE
γRl−α − γSl−αSE
e
− µ
γSl
−α
SE
[
1− eµm
(
1
γSl
−α
SE
− 1
γRl
−α
)]
+ e
− γSL
−α
SR N
γRl
−α
[
1− e−
(µ−µm)
γSl
−α
SE
]
1(µ > γSL
−α
SR N). (44)
Proof. See Appendix B.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY (SOP)
In this section, we evaluate the secure performance of the
proposed system through the SOP. We first suppose that each
Ei succeeds in partially decoding the received signal if its
instantaneous SNR is large than or equal to a certain threshold
µ at the receiver of Ei. When eavesdroppers are non-colluding,
we can define an outage event as the event in which “there
is at least a certain Ei which can partially decode its received
signal.” Based on this definition, the SOP is referred to as the
probability of the occurrence of the outage event, i.e.
ŜOPµ , P {outage event}
= P
{
∃ Ei ∈ Ψ
∣∣∣ŜNRE ≥ µ}
= P
{
max
Ei∈Ψ
ŜNRE ≥ µ
}
(45)
in which maxEi∈Ψ ŜNRE ≥ µ implies that among existing
eavesdroppers, the eavesdropper with the maximum received
SNR can decode signals.8
A. Analysis with large N
Under the assumption of (very) large N , we can use (45),
(38) and (39) to arrive at the following approximation
ŜOPµ
N→∞−−−−→ SOPµ = P
{
max
Ei∈Ψ
snrE ≥ µ
}
= 1− EΨ
{∏
Ei∈Ψ
P
{
snrE < µ
∣∣Ψ}}
(a)
= 1− exp
{
−λ
∫ 2pi
0
∫ RΨ
0
(1− FsnrE(µ)) ldldφ
}
(46)
8For the colluding eavesdroppers scenario, the outage event should be
defined as the event of the occurrence
∑
Ei∈Ψ ŜNRE ≥ µ. This interesting
scenario might not be mathematically tractable and will be considered in the
future.
where the equality (a) follows from the probability generating
functional (PGF) [16]. Herein, P{snrE < µ
∣∣Ψ} = FsnrE(µ) is
the probability that a certain Ei cannot decode the received
signal. In the following, we evaluate the SOP for two schemes
of interest. Note that SOPµ ≡ SOPAFµ and SOPµ ≡ SOPDFµ
for the two different relaying cases.
1) AF scheme: The SOP in the AF case is given by
SOPAFµ = 1− exp
−λ
∫ 2pi
0
∫ RΨ
0
(
1− FsnrAFE (µ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
a function of l and φ
ldldφ
 .
(47)
By substituting (40) into (47), we have
SOPAFµ = 1− exp
{
−λ
∫ 2pi
0
∫ RΨ
0
[
Tµm(l)1(µm < γSL−αSR N)
+
γSL
−α
SR N(1 + γSL
−α
SR N)
γRl−α
Jµm(l, lSE)
]
ldldφ
}
(48)
which can also be explicitly presented as in (49) at the top of
the next page.
2) DF scheme: The SOP in the DF case is given by
SOPDFµ = 1− exp
−λ
∫ 2pi
0
∫ RΨ
0
(
1− FsnrDFE (µ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
a function of l and φ
ldldφ

(50)
by repeating the same steps as in the derivation of (47).
Substituting (44) into the above equation, we arrive at the
final exact expression for (50) as shown in (55) at the top of
the next page.
B. Analysis with large N and high γS
With very large N , we proceed to consider the performance
at high γS (i.e. γS →∞). With finite µ, we nearly have µm =
min{µ, γSL−αSR N} = µ. Herein, we do not consider the case
of high γR because the instantaneous increase in N and γR
is obviously costly and impractical. Once N is large, γR had
better be low to reduce the power consumption per antenna at
R.
1) AF scheme: We consider the following terms:
T(l) , lim
γS→∞
Tµm(l)1
(
µm < γSL
−α
SR N
)
= lim
γS→∞
exp
{
(1 + γSL
−α
SR N)µ
γRl−α(µ− γSL−αSR N)
}
= exp
{−µ/(γRl−α)} (51)
and
J(l) , lim
γS→∞
γSL
−α
SR N(1 + γSL
−α
SR N)
γRl−α
Jµm(l, lSE)
=
(γSL
−α
SR N)
2
γRl−α
∫ µ
0
e
γSL
−α
SR Nx
γRl
−α(−γSL−αSR N)
(γSL
−α
SR N)
2
dx
= 1− exp{−µ/(γRl−α)} . (52)
7SOPAFµ = 1− exp
{
−λ
∫ 2pi
0
∫ RΨ
0
[
exp
{
(1 + γSL
−α
SR N)µm
γRl−α(µm − γSL−αSR N)
}
1(µm < γSL
−α
SR N)
+
γSL
−α
SR N(1 + γSL
−α
SR N)
γRl−α
exp
{ −µ
γS(L2SR + l
2 − 2LSRl cosφ)−α/2
}
×
∫ µm
0
exp
{
x
γS(L2SR+l
2−2LSRl cosφ)−α/2 +
(1+γSL
−α
SR N)x
γRl−α(x−γSL−αSR N)
}
(x− γSL−αSR N)2
dx
]
ldldφ
}
(49)
SOPDFµ = 1− exp
{
−λ
∫ 2pi
0
∫ RΨ
0
[
e
− µm
γRl
−α − e−
γSL
−α
SR N
γRl
−α
(
1− e
µm−µ
γS(L2SR+l2−2LSRl cosφ)
−α/2
)
1(µ > γSL
−α
SR N)
− γS
(
L2SR + l
2 − 2LSRl cosφ
)−α/2
γRl−α − γS (L2SR + l2 − 2LSRl cosφ)−α/2
exp
{
− µ
γS (L2SR + l
2 − 2LSRl cosφ)−α/2
}
×
(
1− exp
{
µm
(
1
γS (L2SR + l
2 − 2LSRl cosφ)−α/2
− 1
γRl−α
)})]
ldldφ
}
(55)
Taking limit (40) at γS →∞, we have
lim
γS→∞
FsnrAFE (µ) = 1− T(l)− J(l) = 0. (53)
Then using the two above-calculated limits, we reach the limit
of P
{
ΛAFE
}
in (48) at γS →∞ as follows:
SOPAFµ,asym = lim
γS→∞
SOPAFµ
= 1− exp
{
−λ
∫ 2pi
0
∫ RΨ
0
(1− 0) ldldφ
}
= 1− exp{−piλR2Ψ} . (54)
2) DF scheme: Taking limit (44) at γS →∞, we have
lim
γS→∞
FsnrDFE (µ) = 1− e
− µm
γRl
−α +
γSl
−α
SE(−γSl−αSE )
(
1− e−
µm
γRl
−α
)
= 0. (56)
Then, the limitation of (50) is given by
SOPDFµ,asym = limγS→∞
SOPDFµ
= 1− exp
{
−λ
∫ 2pi
0
∫ RΨ
0
(1− 0) ldldφ
}
= 1− exp{−piλR2Ψ} . (57)
Remark 1. We observe from (54) and (57) that when γS
increases, the role of the considered relaying operations comes
to be indistinguishable since both AF and DF cases give the
same value at high γS. Indeed, this observation can also be
realized in a more intuitive manner: First, we take the limit
of (35), i.e,
lim
γS→∞
snrAFE = lim
γS→∞
{
γSL
−α
SR γRl
−αNΘ
γSL
−α
SR N
}
+ γSl
−α
SE |hSE|2
= γRl
−αΘ + γSl−αSE |hSE|2,
lim
γS→∞
snrDFE = lim
γS→∞
{
min
{
γSL
−α
SR N, γRl
−αΘ
}
+ γSl
−α
SE |hSE|2
}
= γRl
−αΘ + γSl−αSE |hSE|2. (58)
Then taking the limit of SOPAFµ in (49) and SOP
DF
µ in (55),
we arrive at the same conclusion, i.e. limγS→∞ SOP
AF
µ =
limγS→∞ SOP
DF
µ .
Proposition 3. For given µ, both SOPAFµ and SOP
DF
µ in-
crease with γS. Furthermore, they are upper bounded by the
limit 1−exp{−piλR2Ψ}, which increases with λ as well as RΨ.
In this respect, we can conclude that when the eavesdroppers’
density λ becomes denser or their working range RΨ becomes
wider, the upper limit of the SOP in two relaying cases will
be higher accordingly.
Proof. Please see Appendix C.
V. CONNECTION OUTAGE PROBABILITY (COP)
To deal with the attacks from eavesdroppers as well as
restrict information leakage to a certain extent, we consider
an on-off transmission strategy (a recent paper [32] as an
example). As for this strategy, some threshold η is compared
to the instantaneous SNR at D before the transmission is
performed. More precisely, if ŜNRD ≤ η, then S had better
keep silent (OFF-state); in contrast, S will transmit confidential
signals (ON-state). As such, the transmission will be in the
OFF-state with the probability P
{
ŜNRD ≤ η
}
which can be
named as the COP, i.e.
ĈOPη ≡ P {OFF-state} , P
{
ŜNRD ≤ η
}
. (59)
A. Analysis with large N
Under the assumption of (very) large N , we can use (59),
(34) and (36) to arrive at the following approximation
ĈOPη
N→∞−−−−→ COPη = P {snrD ≤ η} . (60)
In the following, we analyze the COP for the AF scheme and
the DF scheme, repesctively.
81) AF scheme: We replace snrD with snrAFD into the above
expression to obtain the COP for the AF case, i.e.
COPAFη = P
{
snrAFD ≤ η
}
= P
{
γSL
−α
SR γRL
−α
RD N
2
γSL
−α
SR N + γRL
−α
RD N + 1
≤ η
}
= P
{
γSL
−α
SR N
(
γRL
−α
RD N − η
) ≤ η (γRL−αRD N + 1)}
=
 1, if γR ≤ ΩηP{γS ≤ η(γRL−αRD N+1)L−αSR N(γRL−αRD N−η)
}
, if γR > Ωη
=
 1, if γR ≤ Ωη1, if γR > Ωη and γS ≤ Υη
0, if γR > Ωη and γS > Υη
(61)
where
Ωη , η/
(
NL−αRD
)
, (62)
Υη ,
η
(
γRL
−α
RD N + 1
)
L−αSR L
−α
RD N
2 (γR − Ωη)
. (63)
There is no surprise that the COP takes only two values, either
1 or 0, due to the fact that all parameters γS, γR, N , α, LSR,
LRD, and η are predetermined. From the design perspective,
we want COPη = 0 because it implies that the confidential
transmission can occur (in the ON-state). As such, considering
the on-off transmission strategy, designers must make sure that
the two following conditions hold true:{
γR > Ωη
γS > Υη
. (64)
2) DF scheme: With snrDFD substituted for snrD in (60),
the COP for the DF case can be calculated as
COPDFη = P
{
snrDFD ≤ η
}
= P
{
min
{
γSL
−α
SR N, γRL
−α
RD N
} ≤ η}
=

1, if γS ≤ ωη and γS ≤ γR (LRD/LSR)−α
0, if γS > ωη and γS ≤ γR (LRD/LSR)−α
1, if γR ≤ Ωη and γS > γR (LRD/LSR)−α
0, if γR > Ωη and γS > γR (LRD/LSR)
−α
(65)
where
ωη , η/
(
NL−αSR
)
. (66)
Similarly to the AF case, we wish to have COPη = 0, then{
either Ωη < γR < γS (LSR/LRD)
−α
or ωη < γS ≤ γR (LRD/LSR)−α , (67)
needs to be satisfied.
B. Analysis with large N and high γS
As analyzed in the last subsection, we need to set the
values of γS, γR and N such that the COP is equal to 0
for each relaying strategy at R. With high γS (i.e. γS → ∞)
the second condition in (64) is almost surely true, because
limγS→∞P {γS > Υη} = 1; thus, the COP in the AF case
will approach 0 (i.e. the OFF-state does not occur) at high γS
given that the first condition in (64) is satisfied. Meanwhile, the
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Fig. 2. Possible insecured/secured states of the proposed system versus
corresponding ranges of (snrD, snrEmax).
second condition in (67) does not seem to be achievable at high
γS; thus, the COP can reach 0 as long as the first condition in
(67) is satisfied. In short, the OFF-state occurs at high γS when
Ωη < γR for AF scheme and Ωη < γR < γS (LSR/LRD)
−α for
DF scheme.
VI. SECURITY-RELIABILITY TRADEOFF
In this section, we evaluate the interactions of the important
secure metrics including the SOP, the COP and the end-to-
end (e2e) SR. It is of importance that the SOP and the COP
will be jointly evaluated in another probabilistic metric, i.e.
the probability of achieving the most secured transmission
state P{Â}. With (very) large N , we have P{Â} N→∞−−−−→
P {A}; while the e2e SR (in nats/s/Hz) can be expressed as
Cs =
1
2 max
{
ln
(
1+snrD
1+snrEmax
)
, 0
}
where 1/2 is due to the fact
that the transmission is divided into two equal time slots. All
metrics Cs, SOPµ and COPη involve the same parameter γS;
thus, we respectively rewrite Cs, SOPµ and COPη as Cs(γS),
SOPµ(γS) and COPη(γS) to emphasize the role of γS in our
analysis for the rest of this paper.
Now, let us look at Fig. 2 which is provided for illustration.
In the figure, there are two regions for the e2e SR, the region
y0z corresponds to Cs(γS) = 0 (i.e. snrD ≤ snrEmax), the
region x0z corresponds to Cs(γS) > 0 (i.e. snrD > snrEmax).
Still in Fig. 2, we consider the two scenarios of η as follows:
• With η > µ, the transmission only occurs in the ON-
state (COPη(γS) = 0) if a pair of (snrD, snrEmax) lies
in the region uA1x. In this case, there are 3 subcases
corresponding to 3 regions:
– uA3z has Cs(γS) = 0 and snrEmax ≥ µ.
– zA3A2v has Cs(γS) > 0 and snrEmax ≥ µ.
– vA2A1x has Cs(γS) > 0 and snrEmax < µ.
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Fig. 3. SOPAFµ in (49) and SOP
DF
µ in (55) versus γS. For each relaying
scheme, two subcases are considered: LSR = 1 and LSR = 4. Other
parameters: N = 50, λ = 0.25, RΨ = 1, α = 2.5, γR = 10 dB, µ = 16.02
dB.
• With η ≤ µ, the transmission only occurs (in the ON-
state) if the considered pair of instantaneous SNRs lies
in the region uA4x. In this case, there are 4 subcases:
– uA6A7z has Cs(γS) = 0 and snrEmax ≥ µ.
– zA7v has Cs(γS) > 0 and snrEmax ≥ µ.
– A5A6A7 has Cs(γS) = 0 and snrEmax < µ.
– vA7A5A4x has Cs(γS) > 0 and snrEmax < µ.
Obviously, if we have (snrD, snrEmax) ∈ vA2A1x in the
case of η > µ and/or (snrD, snrEmax) ∈ vA7A5A4x in the case
of η ≤ µ, the proposed system will attain the most secured
state with Cs(γS) > 0, COPµ(γS) = 0 and snrEmax < µ. We
only focus on the case of η > µ in this paper and evaluate the
probability of the event A = {(snrD, snrEmax) ∈ vA2A1x}.
Of course, this event is the expected one because the security
state of our system is guaranteed at most. The probability of
the occurrence of the event A is given by
P {A} = P {(snrD, snrEmax) ∈ vA2A1x |η > µ}
= P {η < snrD, snrEmax < µ}
= P
{
max
Ei∈Ψ
snrE < µ
}
P {η < snrD}
= [1− SOPµ(γS)] [1− COPη(γS)] . (68)
We will denote P {A} as P {A}AF and P {A}DF for the AF
case and DF case, respectively.
A. AF case
In order to maximize the probability P {A}AF , we aim to
solve the following optimization problem:
(PAF ) minimize
γS
SOPAFµ (γS)
subject to COPAFη (γS) = 0.
Using (64), the constraint turns out to be γR > Ωη and γS >
Υη . Once the constraint γR > Ωη is satisfied, (PAF ) has the
optimal solution
γS,opt → Υ+η (69)
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Fig. 4. SOPAFµ in (49) versus γS. For each relaying scheme, two subcases
are considered: (case 1) RΨ = 2; (case 2) RΨ = 1; and (case 3) RΨ = 0.5.
Other parameters: N = 50, λ = 0.25, LSR = 2, α = 2.5, γR = 10 dB,
µ = 16.02 dB.
because SOPAFµ (γS) > SOP
AF
µ (Υη) for all γS > Υη (accord-
ing to Proposition 3). In contrast, if the constraint γR > Ωη
is not satisfied, the event A does not occur regardless of any
value of γS. As such, we have
max
γS
P {A}AF =
{
1− SOPAFµ (Υ+η ), if γR > Ωη
0, if γR ≤ Ωη . (70)
B. DF case
In the same way as the AF case, we suggest the optimization
problem for the DF case as follows:
(PDF ) minimize
γS
SOPDFµ (γS)
subject to COPDFη (γS) = 0.
Using (67), the constraint becomes Ωη < γR <
γS (LSR/LRD)
−α or ωη < γS ≤ γR (LRD/LSR)−α. Moreover,
SOPµ(γS) increases with γS, then the problem (PDF ) has two
optimal solutions:
γS,opt =
{
γ+R (LRD/LSR)
−α
, if γR > Ωη
ω+η , if γR ≥ ω+η (LSR/LRD)−α , $
.
(71)
Finally, the maximal value of P {A}DF can be readily de-
duced from (71) as follows:
max
γS
P {A}DF
=

max
{
P {A}DFopt,1 ,P {A}DFopt,1
}
, if Ωη < $ ≤ γR
or γR > Ωη ≥ $,
P {A}DFopt,1 , if Ωη < γR < $,
P {A}DFopt,2 , if Ωη ≥ γR ≥ $,
0, if γR ≤ Ωη < $
or Ωη ≥ $ > γR
(72)
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Fig. 5. SOPDFµ in (55) versus γS. For each relaying scheme, two subcases
are considered: (case 1) RΨ = 2; (case 2) RΨ = 0.5. Other parameters:
N = 50, λ = 0.25, LSR = 2, α = 2.5, γR = 10 dB, µ = 16.02 dB.
where P {A}DFopt,1 , 1 − SOPDFµ (γS)
∣∣∣
γS=ω
+
η
and
P {A}DFopt,2 , 1− SOPDFµ (γS)
∣∣∣
γS=γ
+
R (LRD/LSR)
−α .
Remark 2. Both cases require the cooperation between S and
R such that γS and γR meet the requirement for quality of
service (i.e. P {A} is maximized). When the parameter γR
is beforehand chosen, we only need to set up the parameter
γS to reach the goal. Hence, we choose γR > Ωη in the AF
case; meanwhile, γR should satisfy either Ωη < $ ≤ γR or
γR > Ωη ≥ $ in the DF case.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section provides several numerical examples to verify
the correctness of our analysis and show secure characteristics
of the proposed system. Relating to distance parameters, the
distance reference R0 is traditionally selected from 100 m to 1
km for large cellular systems [22]–[24]. With the selection of
R0 within [100m, 1000m], the measurement unit of λ will be
implicitly understood as the average number of eavesdroppers
over R0×R0 m2. Note that the selected value of R0 does not
change our numerical results, which depend on the distance
ratios LSR, LRD and RΨ. Furthermore, a suitable value of the
path loss exponent α should be from 2 to 3. Thus, we choose to
set α = 2.5 for all numerical examples. Finally, it is of crucial
importance that all simulation results have been performed for
ŜOPµ, ĈOPη and P{Â}; whereas, all analytical results have
been performed for SOPµ, COPη and P {A}.
In Figs. 3–5, we present the SOPs versus γS in the AF
and DF scheme. The analytical expressions for the SOP are
verified through simulation, i.e. ŜOPµ
N→∞−−−−→ SOPµ and
ŜOPµ
N,γS→∞−−−−−−→ SOPµ,asym are confirmed. As seen from the
figures, the simulated values of ŜOPµ and the analytical values
of SOPµ match each other at large N (i.e. N = 50) through
the range [0, 40] dB of γS. Besides, these values increase with
γS and converges to SOPµ,asym at high γS (for example, at
40 dB).
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Fig. 6. SOPAFµ in (49) and SOP
DF
µ in (55) versus λ. Parameters: N = 50,
RΨ = 2, LSR = 2, α = 2.5, γS = 10 dB, γR = 10 dB, µ = 16.02 dB.
In Fig. 3, two subcases of LSR are considered, i.e. LSR =
{1, 4}. We can see that the security performance in AF
case is better than DF case for each considered value of
LSR. However, when γS exceeds over 15 dB for the case of
LSR = 1, the security performance in the AF scheme and
that in the DF scheme is the same and thereby, the role of the
relaying protocols becomes indistinguishable. Interestingly, the
decrease in LSR (i.e. S comes closer to R) does not ensure that
the secure performance will be improved.
Regarding Figs. 4–5, we fix the distance ratio LSR and
change the radius ratio RΨ. We observe that the secure
performance inversely decreases with the increase in RΨ. This
observation can also be recorded from the practice that with
the working range extension, the eavesdroppers will become
more dangerous. In Fig. 6, we depict the SOPs versus λ.
Again, the results confirm again that the AF scheme gives
better secure performance. Moreover, the difference in perfor-
mance between two schemes becomes less with the increase
in γS. Besides, the increasing density of eavesdroppers also
causes a worse situation for the proposed system (as can be
observed intuitively).
In Fig. 7, we depict the COPs versus γS in the AF case and
verify ĈOP
AF
µ
N→∞−−−−→ COPAFµ . The results show that when N
increases, our analysis becomes more precise because the gap
between simulation curve (i.e. ĈOP
AF
η ) and analytical curve
(i.e. COPAFη ) is narrowed. In the case of N = 40, the first
constraint γR > Ωη is satisfied, i.e. γR = 10 dB > 8.38 dB,
then the COP theoretically reaches 0 at any γR > Υη ≈ 16.6
dB. Likewise, in the case of N = 70, the constraint γR ≈
13.01 dB > 5.95 dB, then the COP is expected to be 0 at any
γR > Υη ≈ 11.26 dB. In comparison between two cases, we
can see that the increase in N helps to enhance the reliability.
For example, if the secure transmission occurs at γS = 15
dB, then N = 70 will be selected because the theoretical
COP equals 0; in contrast, N = 40 will lead to an unsecured
transmission as the theoretical SOP is 1.
In Fig. 8, we depict the COPs versus γS in the DF case.
Similar to the AF case, the gap between the analysis and
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Fig. 7. COPAFη versus γS. Parameters: N = {40, 70}, LSR = 2, LRD = 1.5,
α = 2.5, γR = 10 dB, η = 20 dB.
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Fig. 8. COPDFη versus γS. Parameters: N = {40, 70}, LSR = 2, LRD = 1.5,
α = 2.5, γR = 10 dB, η = 20 dB.
simulation becomes more precise when N increases. More-
over, if one of the two conditions in (67) is satisfied, the COP
reaches 0. For example, in the case of N = 40, the condition
Ωη ≈ 108.38/10 < γR = 1010/10 dB < γS (2/1.5)−2.5 can be
attained if γS > 13.12 dB. In the case N = 70, the condition
ωη ≈ 109.07/10 < γS ≤ 1010/10 (1.5/2)−2.5 ⇔ 9.07 dB <
γS ≤ 13.12 dB will lead to COPDFη = 0.
In Fig. 9, the probability of the most secured state P {A}AF
is shown with respect to γS. The results show that the
agreement between the analytical curves and the simulation
curves can be obtained with N increased. We can see that
with N = 50, we have P {A}AF > 0 at any γS > 21 dB. In
contrast, to have P {A}AF > 0 in the case of N = 70, we
have to set γS > 19 dB. As such, the increase in N helps
ensure P {A}AF > 0 when γS decreases. As analyzed in
Section VI, P {A}AF reaches its maximum when γS → Υ+η .
For example, in theoretical perspective, with N = 70 we
have maxγS P {A}AF = P {A}AF
∣∣
γS=Υη+ ≈ 0.811 where
 is a very small positive number. Likewise, in Fig. 10,
the probability of the most secured state P {A}DF is also
illustrated with γS. The behaviour of P {A}DF is similar to
P {A}AF . The increase in N makes the secure performance
more guaranteed as long as the transmission state is in the
ON-state.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered a relay-aided wireless
system with the large antenna array equipped at the relay. In
the presence of many potential eavesdroppers, we assume that
they follow a homogeneous PPP. Furthermore, compared to
the destination, all eavesdroppers have much more advantages
when direct links between them and the source are discussed.
Under such assumptions, we have employed the ON-OFF
strategy and evaluated the security as well as the reliability
of the system through probabilistic metrics. Analysis and
simulation results show that the increase in γS reduces the
secure performance in both AF and DF case. The increase
in γS, however, helps enhance the reliability in both the AF
case and the DF case. Finally, two appropriate optimization
problems have been proposed for each relaying scheme such
that the probability of achieving the most secured state in
each transmission is optimal. On the other side, a large value
of N makes the COP reach 0, which means that a secured
transmission can occur thanks to the increase in N .
APPENDIX
A. The CDF of snrAFE
Let us define X = γSL
−α
SR γRl
−αNΘ
(γSL−αSR N+1)+γRl−αΘ
. The CDF and PDF
of X can be, respectively, calculated as
FX (x) = P
{
(γSL
−α
SR N − x)γRl−αΘ ≤ (γSL−αSR N + 1)x
}
= 1− exp
{
(1 + γSL
−α
SR N)x
γRl−α(x− γSL−αSR N)
}
1(x < γSL
−α
SR N)
(73)
and
fX (x) = exp
{
(1 + γSL
−α
SR N)x
γRl−α(x− γSL−αSR N)
}
× γSL
−α
SR N(1 + γSL
−α
SR N)
γRl−α(x− γSL−αSR N)2
1(x < γSL
−α
SR N). (74)
As such, snrAFE in (35) is rewritten as snr
AF
E =
γSl
−α
SE |hSE|2 + X . The CDF of snrAFE is given by
FsnrAFE (µ) =
∫ µm
0
F|hSE|2
(
µ− x
γSl
−α
SE
)
fX (x)dx (75)
where µm , min{µ, γSL−αSR N}. After some manipulations,
(75) is expressed in the form of (40).
B. The CDF of snrDFE
Let us define Y = min{γSL−αSR N, γRl−αΘ}. The CDF and
PDF of Y can be, respectively, calculated as
FY(y) = 1− exp
{
− y
γRl−α
}
1(y < γSL
−α
SR N). (76)
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Fig. 9. P {A}AF versus γS. Parameters:N = {50, 70}, λ = 0.25,RΨ = 1,
LSR = 4, LRD = 1.5, α = 2.5, µ = 16.02 dB, η = 20 dB, γR = 10 dB.
and
fY(y) =
1
γRl−α
exp
{
− y
γRl−α
}
+ exp
{
−γSL
−α
SR N
γRl−α
}
δ
(
y − γSL−αSR N
)
(77)
for y ≤ γSL−αSR N , where δ
(
y − γSL−αSR N
)
is a Dirac delta
function in y.
Now we can rewrite snrDFE in (37) as snr
AF
E =
γSl
−α
SE |hSE|2 + Y . The CDF of snrDFE is given by
FsnrDFE (µ) =
∫ µm
0
F|hSE|2
(
µ− y
γSl
−α
SE
)
fY(y)dy. (78)
After some manipulations, (78) is expressed in the form of
(44).
C. Proof of Proposition 3
First, we note that both snrE and SOPµ are functions of γS.
To emphasize this, we rewrite snrE and SOPµ as snrE(γS)
and SOPµ(γS), respectively. It is straightforward to show
snrE(p2) − snrE(p1) ≥ 0 for p2 > p1, thus snrE(γS) is an
increasing function of γS. For p2 > p1, we have
P {snrE(p2) < µ|Ψ} < P {snrE(p1) < µ|Ψ}
⇒ 1− EΨ
{∏
Ei∈Ψ
P {snrE(p2) < µ|Ψ}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
SOPµ(p2)
> 1− EΨ
{∏
Ei∈Ψ
P {snrE(p1) < z|Ψ}
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
SOPµ(p1)
(79)
which demonstrates that SOPµ(γS) increases with γS. More-
over, limγS→∞ SOPµ = 1 − exp{−piλR2Ψ} as calculated in
(54) and (57) for each considered case, thus this limit value
is also the upper bound of SOPµ at high γS.
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Fig. 10. P {A}DF versus γS. Parameters: N = {50, 70}, λ = 0.25, RΨ =
1, LSR = 4, LRD = 1.5, α = 2.5, µ = 16.02 dB, η = 20 dB, γR = 10 dB.
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